

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes

A multilevel study across 67 countries

To appear in International Journal of Social Welfare

Ferry Koster

Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam,

Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, University of Amsterdam,

and Leiden Law School, University of Leiden

Contact:

Department of Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50

PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, the Netherlands

Tel: +31(0)10-408 2231

Fax: +31(0)10-408 9098

E-mail: koster@fsw.eur.nl

www.ferrykoster.nl

Abstract

This article extends previous studies investigating economic globalisation and the welfare state by examining individual attitudes, ranging from a preference for individual responsibility (economic individualism) to public demand for government intervention (social equality), across a large number of countries. It formulates different hypotheses about the direct and moderating effects of economic openness on these attitudes. The multilevel analysis, investigating data from 99,663 citizens of 67 countries, leads to the following two conclusions. First, economic openness is associated with a stronger preference for economic individualism and less demand for government intervention. Secondly, groups benefiting from globalisation and right voters have a stronger preference for economic individualism if the economic openness of their country is higher.

Key words: globalisation, welfare state, solidarity, attitudes, international comparison

Key Practitioner Message: The results show that some vulnerable groups demand more social protection in economically more open countries.

Introduction

Several studies investigate how economic openness, a country's integration into the world market (for example through international trade and foreign direct investments), relates to the welfare state in terms of public social spending, tax levels and the generosity of social provisions. There are different and contrasting theories concerning this relationship. Some of these theories predict that economic openness threatens the welfare state because high levels of social spending undermine the competitiveness of a country and make it vulnerable to tax flight, while others emphasise that governments of economically open countries compensate citizens for fluctuations on the world market and that investments in the welfare state strengthens a country's competitiveness (Barro, 1991; Bowles & Wagman, 1997; Brady, Seeleib-Kaiser & Beckfield, 2005; Busemeyer 2009; De Beer & Koster, 2009; Garrett & Mitchell, 2001; Koster, 2009; Mishra, 1999; Rodrik, 1998; Scharpf, 2000). Empirical investigations of these hypotheses have generated mixed results and therefore the debate continues.

Most of the previous studies of economic openness and the welfare state rely on national level data. The basic argument underlying the present study is that the mixed outcomes found to date can be better understood if the attitudes of individuals are taken into account. The attitudes investigated here concern the extent to which the public supports individual responsibility or prefers that the government take more responsibility for people's wellbeing. Such a broad measure of welfare state attitudes provides insights into what the public demands from the government in general. The literature on welfare state attitudes argues that there are several explanations of these preferences, namely (1) self-interest (based on security considerations), (2) ideology (based on normative considerations) and (3) trust in

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 4

institutions (whether the government is regarded as a legitimate actor) (e.g. De Beer & Koster, 2009).

In this article, it is argued that economic openness at the national level can have three different effects on welfare state attitudes. The first is that more economic openness goes together with more insecurity and hence leads to a higher demand for government responsibility. The second effect concerns a normative shift and decreasing institutional trust that leads to a preference for individual responsibility. The third possibility is that a polarisation of attitudes can be observed as vulnerable groups demand more protection while advantageous groups are more in favour of individual responsibility. This third option means that the first two expectations can hold at the same time and need not to be mutually exclusive. By doing this, the study enables investigating whether, as Rodrik (1998) argued, citizens' demand for social protection is higher in economically more open countries, which could in turn affect welfare state arrangements (Brooks & Manza, 2008). Furthermore, the analysis presented here contributes to earlier work linking welfare state attitudes and national level factors. While prior studies focus on the impact of institutions (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Rothstein, 1998), this article examines the role of economic openness.

Besides these theoretical considerations, the article aims at expanding the empirical content of comparative welfare state research. Most of the studies conducted so far examine a relatively small range of countries, usually about 10 to 30 advanced economies (De Beer & Koster, 2009). There are some empirical investigations of national level data including more countries (Adserá & Boix, 2002; Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998; Rodrik, 1998), less developed countries (Rudra, 2007; Rudra & Haggard, 2005), and regions such as Latin America (Avelino, Brown & Hunter, 2005; Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001), but such extended analyses are not available in the field of welfare state attitudes.

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 5

Based on earlier research of welfare state attitudes, the present study theorises that economic openness can have different effects on these attitudes. First, there are reasons to expect that welfare state support is higher in economically more open countries. There are, however, also arguments favouring the hypothesis that economic openness decreases support for the welfare state. Thirdly, the article hypothesises that economic openness can influence welfare state attitudes indirectly by moderating the individual level effects. To investigate these hypotheses, data from 99,663 individuals living in 67 countries were analysed using information from the *World Values Study* (WVS) (two waves covering the period between 1994 and 2004), the *Social Security Expenditure Database* (SSED) collected by the *International Labour Organization* (ILO), the *Human Development Reports* of the *United Nations* (UN), and the *Index of Globalization*, which is developed by the KOF (“Konjunkturforschungsstelle”) Swiss Economic Institute.

Welfare state attitudes

Welfare state attitudes range from a preference for individual responsibility to support for government responsibility to cover individual risks, meaning that individuals can be more supportive of economic individualism or have a stronger preference for social equality. These two positions reflect opposite attitudes about the welfare state and vary considerably between individuals. The literature explains these attitudes based on three different theoretical approaches. First, previous research finds that *self-interest* is one of the main predictors of welfare state attitudes (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom, 2003; Van Oorschot, 2002). These studies show that people who are economically more vulnerable and have a higher chance of getting in a needy situation are also more in favour of the welfare state as individuals are assumed to be risk averse. As a result, welfare state preferences

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 6

depend on people's position in society. A preference for economic individualism is more often found among people who are highly educated, men, older people, those with a higher income and people with a job, while support for social equality is preferred by lower educated, women, younger people, people with a lower income and the unemployed.

A second set of explanations concerns people's *ideology* and related beliefs about why people are in need. In general, people regard those who are in need of support due to bad luck and circumstances beyond their control as being more deserving than those who get in a needy situation due to lack of willpower, laziness or a risky lifestyle (Appelbaum, 2001; Bowles & Gintis, 2000). Although this generally holds, deservingness criteria themselves differ across ideological positions, with those on the right side of the political scale having a stronger tendency to blame individuals and with left voters blaming society more often. It should be noted that such considerations can result both from actual experiences and from stereotypical view about the behaviour of others. This difference in ideology and beliefs is associated with different opinions about the welfare state: right voters are more in favour of economic individualism and left voters prefer social equality (Eismeier, 1982; Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan & Levanon, 2003; Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom, 2003; Moene & Wallerstein, 2001; Shapiro & Young, 1989).

A third set of explanations relates welfare state attitudes to levels of *trust in institutions*. The possibilities for exploring this aspect of the welfare state increased as the empirical studies shifted from single-country investigations to cross-national examinations because it enables researchers to test theories linking the macro and micro levels. In particular, these studies show that the welfare state itself influences people's feeling of moral obligation towards others in society, usually in combination with other solidarity enhancing institutions. As a result, once in place, the welfare state can generate mass support and trust

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 7

(Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Blomberg & Kroll, 1999; Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Jaeger, 2006; Mau, 2004; Rothstein, 1994; Svallfors, 1997).

All three explanations are relevant for understanding the effects of the economic openness of a country on people's welfare state attitudes. Based on whether or not economic openness affects people's vulnerability, ideology and their level of trust in institutions, different hypotheses can be formulated.

The effects of economic openness

Social equality or economic individualism

A large share of national level studies finds a positive relationship between economic openness and welfare state arrangements (De Beer & Koster, 2009). The compensation hypothesis explains this finding by arguing that citizens in economically more open countries demand social protection from their governments to compensate them for the risks they run due to fluctuations on the world market (Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein, 1985; Rodrik, 1998). Assuming that citizens are risk averse, they have a preference for government intervention to secure these risks of economic globalisation. This argument views the welfare state as a means to correct market failures (e.g. Williamson, 1975) and to equalise income differences resulting from the market process (Lindbeck, 2006).

Although this hypothesis is well known, there is a gap between its theoretical assumptions and the empirical evidence supporting it. The theoretical argument states that the demand for social protection at the individual level explains the relationship between economic openness and the welfare state at the national level, whereas the empirical investigations rely on national level data. Consequently, the underlying assumption that economic openness leads to more support for the welfare state is not tested. Nevertheless, one

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 8

study that did examine macro and micro level data showed that a country's economic openness is associated with higher levels of subjective job insecurity (Scheve & Slaughter, 2004), which is one reason to assume that people demand more government protection in economically more open countries.

An additional reason to expect such a relationship concerns the deservingness of the beneficiaries of the welfare state. A country's integration in the world market is a phenomenon that most people see as taking place automatically rather than as a development that the average person asks for or can influence individually. From the point of view of the general public, governments are likely to be seen as responsible for increasing economic globalisation by taking the decision to open up their country to the world market and provide large multinationals the possibility to move to their country. Therefore, these collective actors rather than individuals will be seen as the main instigators of risks and uncertainties arising from economic globalisation. If people get in trouble due to such external forces, the majority of the public will regard them as deserving. Both arguments lead to the following hypothesis: *The higher the economic openness at the national level, the more support for government responsibility at the individual level* (Hypothesis 1a).

The other two explanations, political ideology and trust in institutions, provide arguments that counter the expectation that economic openness is associated with a stronger preference for government intervention. First, in addition to globalisation being an economic process consisting of the opening up of national markets through international trade, it is oftentimes associated with privatisation and deregulation leading to public-sector downsizing (O'Riain, 2000; Simmons, Dobbin & Garrett, 2006). The ideological basis of these (neo)liberal policies is the belief that everyone gains if markets operate freely and that state

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 9

intervention leads to inefficiencies and should therefore be minimised (Friedman, 1962; Iversen & Wren, 1998; Snower, 1993). Starting from the 1980s, liberal thinking became more and more popular, with Thatcher and Reagan as its most famous supporters. In the same period, the welfare state came under heavy criticism for reasons such as the costs for funding it, its disturbance of the market process and the creation of welfare state dependent citizens. For many, the welfare state changed from a means to solve societal issues to an institution that creates its own problems. That welfare states have remained rather stable and still receive considerable support from the public despite these attacks during the 1980s (Pierson, 1996) is reason to believe that there will not be much change in the future. The continuing public support is particularly visible with regard to specific programmes that are widely supported, such as the case with public health care (Kikuzawa, Olafsdottir & Pescosolido, 2008). However, others have forcefully argued that things already have changed dramatically because the public repeatedly gets the message that the welfare state reflects the kindness of people but that it is bad for society, which will ultimately lead to less support for the welfare state (Piven, 2001).

The second reason why economic globalisation can undermine welfare state support concerns citizen's trust in institutions. Cross-national comparisons using longitudinal data show that confidence in politicians and government has declined in most advanced industrial countries from the 1970s onwards (Dalton, 2005). Such increasing political cynicism can have negative consequences for welfare state support and legitimacy (Weatherford, 1992). Different mechanisms may explain the observed decrease in trust. Increased economic globalisation may be one of them as, for example, Alesina, and Wacziarg (2000) showed. According to their model, globalisation is associated with two features that increase voter dissatisfaction, namely limited leeway for implementing policies and the transfer of power to

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 10

supranational institutions. As a result, governments have considerable less room to manoeuvre and it becomes more likely that the public will blame them for not being able to deal sufficiently with the challenges and uncertainties stemming from increased integration with the world market. Rather than more support for government responsibility, these arguments lead to the prediction that economic openness decreases such support in favour of individual responsibility. This leads to the following hypothesis about the effects of economic openness: *The higher the economic openness at the national level, the more support for individual responsibility at the individual level* (Hypothesis 1b).

Polarisation of welfare state attitudes

While the previous two hypotheses state a direct relationship between the welfare state attitudes of citizens and the economic openness of the country in which they live, it is also possible to formulate a more complex hypothesis. This hypothesis is based on the argument that economic openness can have a distinct effect on different societal groups, depending on how vulnerable or advantageous they are. This means that the first two hypotheses represent two sides of the same coin and that economic openness moves the attitudes of some groups in the direction of economic liberalism and those of other groups towards social equality. Hence, this argument holds that economic openness can have an indirect rather than a direct effect on welfare state attitudes. This third hypothesis thus deviates from the first two as it argues that that the effects are not similar for everyone in society, but depend on one's position in society. Furthermore, it does not treat the two hypotheses as two possibilities that are mutually exclusive. Hence, this hypothesis is in line with the idea that economic globalisation makes some groups worse off and improves the position of others, thus creating winners and losers (O'Brien & Leichenko, 2003). While prior research tends to focus either on the victims facing

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 11

increased uncertainty (Blossfeld, Buchholz & Hofäcker, 2006; Rodrik, 1997) or those having an improved position in the world market (Wood, 1994), this hypothesis aims at taking both groups into account at the same time.

By building on theoretical notions about self-interest, ideology and trust in institutions, hypotheses about a moderating effect of economic openness are formulated. If it is assumed that economic openness worsens the position of the vulnerable groups while it means an improvement for groups that are benefiting from globalisation, the self-interest explanation predicts that higher levels of economic openness leads to diverging welfare state attitudes between the winners and losers of globalisation. A similar kind of divergence is likely to be observed with regard to ideological positions in terms of political party preference, if we assume that left voters are somewhat sceptical of globalisation and right voters are in favour of a free market. From that, it follows that a higher level of economic openness leads to polarising welfare state attitudes of left and right voters. Finally, divergence of opinions may occur with regard to political trust, leading to a stronger preference for economic individualism among those who do not trust their government and a stronger preference for social equality among those with a high level of trust in their government if economic openness is higher.

In other words, instead of predicting that welfare state support is higher in general because of an increased demand for social protection or that welfare state support is lower due to a more liberal ideology and a decline in political trust, the following hypothesis states that the effects of economic openness differ depending on the consequences it has for individuals. Different outcomes are possible. While economic openness affects the welfare states attitudes of one of the groups, this does not necessarily have to be the case for their counterparts. Therefore, the following two hypotheses are not contrasting each other, and rejecting or

confirming one of them does not imply the confirmation or rejection of the other. *The higher the economic openness at the national level, the stronger is the preference for government responsibility at the individual level among (a) people belonging to vulnerable groups, (b) left voters and (c) people with a high level of political trust (Hypothesis 2a) and the stronger the preference for individual responsibility at the individual level among (a) advantageous groups, (b) right voters, and (c) people who have a low level of political trust (Hypothesis 2b).*

Data and analysis

Data

Data from different sources were combined to test the hypotheses. Individual attitudes and background characteristics are available through the *World Values Study* (WVS) dataset (World Values Study, 2009). This large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey research programme offers insights into the preferences and orientations of various populations covering a wide range of economic, social, political and cultural variations (Halman, 2001; ICPSR, 2006). To date, five waves of the WVS have been collected. The present study aimed to include a wide range of countries. Most of the countries investigated here, namely 56, were surveyed in wave 4 of the WVS (held between 1999 and 2004). To expand the dataset, 11 countries that were investigated in the third wave (held between 1994 and 1999) but not in the fourth were added. As a result, the dataset includes information about 99,663 individuals in 67 countries from different regions of the world. Appendix A provides a complete overview of the countries in the dataset.

These data were merged with country level data. Data about the economic openness of countries are available through the *KOF Index of Globalization* (Dreher, Gaston & Martens,

2008). National level control variables about the welfare state and income inequality are available through the *Social Security Expenditure Database* (SSED) of the ILO (ILO-SSED, 2009) and the *UN's Human Development Reports* (UN-HDR, 2009). The individual and the national level data were merged based on the year of the WVS survey. This made it possible to investigate the effects of economic openness, welfare state effort and inequality at the time the survey was held.

Variables

The WVS measures *welfare state attitudes* with the following item. People are asked whether they think (1) individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves or (10) that the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. A lower score indicates a preference for economic individualism and a higher score indicates that the respondent favours social equality; thus, respondents have a clear choice concerning the division of responsibility between individuals and the governments (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Arts & Van der Veen, 1992; Kaltenthaler & Ceccoli, 2008).

At the individual level, variables were included that measured vulnerability, party preference and trust in institutions. Since the theoretical framework distinguishes between vulnerable and advantageous groups, the variables measuring the background characteristics of respondents are recoded into dummy variables. The variable age is measured in years and recoded into 0 (younger than 55) and 1 (55 and older). Gender is coded as 0 (male) and 1 (female). Educational level is measured with eight categories, which are recoded into 0 (level 1 through 4) and 1 (1 = level 5 through 8). Income is measured on a scale from 1 to 10 and is recoded into 0 (level 1 through 5) and 1 (level 6 through 10). The dummy variable measuring employment is coded as 0 (no) and 1 (yes). *Party preference* is measured with the answer to

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 14

the question: In political matters, people talk of the left and the right. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (1 = left; 10 = right). This results in the dummy variable with the value 0 (1 through 5) and 1 (6 through 10). The variable *political trust* was measured with the question: Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government? (1 = none at all; 4 = a great deal). The dummy variable was recoded as (0) indicating a score of 1 or 2 and (1) indicating a score of 3 or 4.

The independent variable *economic openness* was measured by (1) economic flows through international trade, foreign investments and portfolio investments (all three relative to GDP) and (2) constraints on trade through trade barriers, taxes on imports, taxes on trade and an index of capital control. Each variable was transformed to an index with a value between 1 and 100, with 100 being the maximum value for a specific variable between the years 1970 and 2005. A higher value indicated a higher level of openness. The weights of the different indexes were calculated using principal components analysis for the whole sample. The weights were determined in a way that maximised the variation of the resulting principal component to capture the variation as fully as possible (Dreher et al, 2008).

To control for other national level influences, the models include the variables *welfare state effort*, measured with total social spending as a share of GDP, and the *Gini coefficient*, indicating the level of income inequality in a country. Finally, a dummy variable is added indicating the *WVS wave* (0 = wave 3; 1 = wave 4) to control for changes in welfare state attitudes. To be sure that the inclusion of different waves do not affect the outcomes, models are specified with and without the 11 countries surveyed in wave 3. These effects are similar to the ones reported here.

Table 1 shows the country with the lowest value and the one with the highest value, the overall mean and the data source for each variable. The mean of the variable welfare state

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 15

attitude is close to the middle position of the scale ($m = 5.66$) and differs between countries. The citizens from Switzerland are closer to the economic individualism position of the scale (together with France, Austria, Sweden and the USA), while the citizens of the Republic of Korea (and people from Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Chile) are the closest to the social equality end of the scale. Furthermore, Table 1 shows the country difference between the WVS respondents with regard to their age, gender, level of education, chances of having a job, party preference and political trust. Finally, the national level variables differ across countries. Welfare state effort varies from 0.97 in Pakistan (other countries with low levels of social spending are Nigeria, Peru, Uganda, and Venezuela) to 56.94 in Germany (other extensive welfare states are Austria, Finland, France and Luxembourg). Hungary has the most equal income distribution (Gini coefficients are also low in Denmark, Belgium, Iceland and Sweden) and income inequality is particularly high in South Africa (Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Zimbabwe also have a high Gini coefficient). Finally, economic openness varies across countries. The least open country is Bangladesh (followed by Iran, India, Pakistan and the Dominican Republic) and Luxembourg is the most open country (followed by Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Method

Multilevel regression modelling was applied to analyse the data, consisting of national level variables (level 2) and individual level variables (level 1). Because the individual responses are nested in countries, traditional regression methods, such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, cannot be used (DiPrete & Forristal, 1994; Goldstein, 2003; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Multilevel models explain micro level outcomes by showing that the parameters at the micro level are a function of the macro level and that this relationship can be expressed in

terms of the macro level variables (DiPrete & Forristal, 1994). In its general form, the multilevel model has a fixed part (the linear function of the independent variables) and a random part (in this particular case, the unexplained variation at the individual level and the unexplained variation between the countries) (Snijders, 2003).

The analyses were conducted in four steps. First, an empty model (Model 0) was computed which served as a baseline model. Model 1 includes the individual level variables, the national level control variables and the dummy variable indicating the WVS wave. In Model 3, the variable economic openness was added to the model, testing its direct effect hypothesised in Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Finally, Model 4 includes the interaction terms between the individual level variables and economic openness to test the moderating effect formulated in Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The parameters of these models were estimated by the maximum likelihood method (Goldstein, 2003) and the regression coefficients were tested by Wald tests (Snijders, 2003). The deviance between the models (the differences in -2 log-likelihood) evaluates the fit of the different models. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was calculated as the variance at level 2 as a share of the total variance. The independent variables are standardised. The data were analysed using MLwiN (Rasbash, Steele, Browne & Prosser, 2005).

Empirical results

Descriptive results

Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between the national level variables together with the country level mean of attitudes towards the welfare state. All variables were strongly related to each other. Concentrating on the welfare state scores, Table 2 shows that, on average, people are more in favour of economic individualism in countries with a more

extensive welfare state and in countries that are economically more open, whereas the preference for social equality is stronger if the income equality of a country is higher. The outcomes with regard to welfare state effort and income equality are in line with previous research showing that the public may function as a thermostat (Koster & Kaminska, 2012). These studies also show that support for the welfare state is lower in countries with higher levels of spending, for example because of dissatisfaction with the performance of the welfare state, and that support for government intervention is higher in more unequal countries, indicating that people in those countries would like to have more equality. The remainder of Table 2 shows that a higher level of social spending goes together with more income equality, and that higher levels of economic openness are associated with a more extensive welfare state, which is in line with the compensation hypothesis, and a higher level of income inequality.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

The results in Table 2 show the relationships between the variables at the national level. The next part of the analysis investigated these relationships more closely by taking into account the mutual effect of the national level variables on welfare state attitudes and by controlling for the individual level variables.

Multilevel regression results

Table 3 summarises the outcomes of the multilevel analysis. The empty model (Model 0) reports an intraclass correlation coefficient of 0.102, indicating that 10 per cent of the variance in welfare state attitudes is situated at the national level. The second model (Model 1) includes the individual variables and the national level control variables. The -2 log-likelihood of the model is significantly lower than that of Model 0 (*deviance* = 799.619; $p <$

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 18

0.01), which means that the fit of the model improves after these variables are added to the model. At the national level, Model 1 replicates the finding of the correlation coefficients, namely that people are more in favour of economic individualism in countries with higher levels of welfare state spending and that they have a stronger preference for social equality in countries where incomes are more equal. That the dummy variable for WVS wave is not significant means that the period in which the respondents are interviewed is not significantly related to their welfare state attitudes. The individual level variables included in Model 1 confirm the findings about self-interest, party preference and trust in institutions found in earlier welfare state studies: the preference for economic individualism is stronger among older people, men, higher educated, people with a higher income level, the employed, those who place themselves on the right side of the political scale and people reporting lower levels of political trust, which also implies that support for social equality is higher among the young, females, lower educated, lower income groups, the unemployed, those with higher levels of political trust and left voters.

Models 2 and 3 test the research hypotheses. Model 2 examines the direct effects of economic openness, formulated in Hypotheses 1 and 2. Adding the variable economic openness to the model changes the regression results found in the previous model. First, the negative relationship between economic openness (significant at the 5% level) and welfare state attitudes indicates that people have a stronger preference for economic individualism if their country is more integrated into the world market. Adding this variable improves the fit of the model (*deviance* = 5.969; $p < 0.05$). Although the individual level effects remain the same after economic openness is added to the model, this does not hold for the national level variables. The effect of welfare state effort disappears and the effect of the Gini coefficient

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 19

becomes smaller and is now significant at the 10 per cent level only. These results of Model 2 lead to the conclusion that Hypothesis 1a is rejected and Hypothesis 1b is supported.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b state that economic openness moderates the relationships between the individual level variables and attitudes towards the welfare state. To test these hypotheses, interaction effects between the seven individual level variables and economic openness were added to the multilevel model. Model 3 shows the outcomes of that analysis, leading to following conclusions. Adding the interaction terms increases the fit of the model compared with the previous one (*deviance* = 45.778; $p < 0.01$). Four out of seven relationships were not moderated by economic openness, implying that their effect is similar across countries and is not dependent on the level of economic openness. The effects of the three remaining variables – age, income, and party preference – turn out to be negatively moderated by economic openness.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

These findings support the hypothesis that economic openness moderates the relationships between individual characteristics and attitudes toward the welfare state. These findings cannot be attributed to a stronger demand for social protection from vulnerable groups and therefore Hypothesis 2a is rejected. Some support is found for Hypothesis 2b which states that the safer groups and right voters are more in favour of economic individualism if economic openness is higher.

Discussion and conclusion

The present study extends existing studies by showing that the level of economic openness is not only related to the social policies of countries, but also to the welfare state attitudes of individuals. More in particular, the analyses lead to the conclusion that economic

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 20

individualism is more strongly preferred in economically more open countries and that there is some evidence for polarisation of attitudes toward the welfare state if the economic openness of a country is higher. These findings have implications for studies about the effects of economic globalisation and leads to new questions for future research.

The results of this study do not confirm the assumption that economic openness is associated with a higher demand for social protection through the welfare state. Instead, economic openness is associated with a stronger preference for economic individualism. Moreover, a higher level of economic openness is not associated with a higher demand for the welfare state among the most vulnerable groups. At the national level, however, a positive relationship between economic openness and welfare state spending was found, as is predicted by the compensation hypothesis. This challenges the explanation that there is a positive relationship between economic openness and welfare state spending because of increased welfare state demand. A possible reason for this is that welfare state research sometimes treats governments as rather passive actors. To some extent, this conception of governments assumes that the integration of the world market is happening to them and that they take action only after the citizens ask for it. In reality, governments influence their country's level of international trade while trying at the same time to provide social protection for their citizens. This does not mean that governments are perfectly rational actors that are always able to strike the right balance between conflicting demands, but it does give them a more active role in the process of globalisation. Therefore, government decisions about trade policies may take into account the level of social protection at a given point in time (and the other way around). From this argument, it follows that governments in economically more open countries had already taken action before the negative consequences could affect the citizens. As a result, the citizens of these countries may not have experienced more insecurity

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 21

as an extensive safety net was already in place before they could notice the consequences of increased economic openness. Whether this interpretation of the historical development of welfare states has any merit is a question to be addressed in future studies that include national level and individual level data about welfare state spending, the openness of the economy, experiences insecurity and political decision-making.

Secondly, the question is what the implications are of the finding that citizens living in economically more open countries are more in favour of economic individualism for the sustainability of the welfare state, given that globalisation increases. If social policies do indeed follow public demand, welfare state cuts should be visible by now. However, as noted in the previous paragraph, this relationship may be much more complex and indirect. A different question is what will happen to the welfare state attitudes of citizens in the more closed economies as the economic openness increases. Will they move in the same direction as their economy opens up? This question can only be answered in the future if the economically less open countries get more integrated in the world market. Finally, this study provides evidence that increased economic openness can threaten the welfare state in a way that may prove to be important in the future, namely the divergence of attitudes within a single country of which the lack of agreement among left and right voters is a good illustration. Such polarisation can have a positive impact as it results in lively political debates, but a negative consequence can be that decision-making becomes less accurate and that the resulting compromises are not satisfactory to any of the groups involved. Eventually, this can undermine the welfare state due to lack of legitimacy and public support. To what extent globalisation does indeed lead to polarisation rather than homogenisation of interests, values and beliefs requires additional research.

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 22

To conclude, this large-scale comparative study emphasises that attitudes toward welfare state are influenced not only by the individual and institutional factors examined previously, but also by the economic openness of countries. Furthermore, it generates a list of new questions to be examined in more detail about the relationship between economic openness and the welfare state.

References

- Adserá, A., & Boix, C. (2002). Trade, democracy, and the size of the public sector: the political underpinnings of openness. *International Organization*, 56(2), 229–262.
- Alesina, A., & Wacziarg, R. (1998). Openness, country size and government. *Journal of Public Economics*, 69(3), 305–321.
- Alesina, A., & Wacziarg, R. (2000). The economics of civic trust. In S. J. Pharr & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), *Disaffected Democracies. What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* (pp. 149–172). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Appelbaum, L.D. (2001). The influence of perceived deservingness on policy decisions regarding aid to the poor. *Political Psychology*, 22(3), 419–442.
- Arts, W., & Gelissen, J. (2001). Welfare states, solidarity and justice principles: does the type really matter? *Acta Sociologica*, 44(4), 283–299.
- Arts, W., & Van der Veen, R. (1992). Sociological approaches to distributive justice and procedural justice. In K. R. Scherer (Ed.), *Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (pp. 143–176). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Avelino, G., Brown, D. S., & Hunter, W. (2005). The effects of capital mobility, trade openness, and democracy on social spending in Latin America, 1980-1999. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), 626–641.
- Barro, R. J. (1991). Economic growth in a cross section of countries. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 106(2), 407–443.
- Blomberg, H., & Kroll, C. (1999). Do structural contexts matter? Macro-Sociological factors and popular attitudes towards public welfare services. *Acta Sociologica*, 42(4), 319–335.
- Blossfeld, H. P., Buchholz, S., & Hofäcker, D. (2006). *Globalization, Uncertainty and Late Careers in Society*. London: Routledge.
- Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2000). Reciprocity, self-interest, and the welfare state. *Nordic Journal of Political Economy*, 26(January), 33–55.
- Bowles, P., & Wagman, B. (1997). Globalization and the welfare state: four hypotheses and some empirical evidence. *Eastern Economic Journal*, 23(3), 317–336 .
- Brady, D., Seeleib-Kaiser, M., & Beckfield, J. (2005). Economic globalization and the welfare state in affluent democracies, 1975–2001. *American Sociological Review*, 70(6), 921–948.

- Brooks, C. & Manza, J. (2008). Why do welfare states persist? *Journal of Politics*, 68(4), 816–827 .
- Busemeyer, M. R. (2009). From myth to reality: globalisation and public spending in OECD countries revisited. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(4), 455–482.
- Cameron, D. (1978). The expansion of the public economy: a comparative analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 72(4), 1243-1261.
- Dalton, R. J. (2005). The social transformation of trust in government. *International Review of Sociology*, 15(1), 133–154.
- De Beer, P. T., & Koster, F. (2009). *Sticking Together or Falling Apart? Solidarity in an Era of Individualization and Globalization* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- DiPrete, T. A., & Forristal, J. D. (1994). Multilevel models. Methods and substance. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 20, 331-357.
- Dreher, A., Gaston, N., & Martens, P. (2008). *Measuring Globalization: Gauging its Consequences*. New York: Springer.
- Eismeier, T. J. (1982). Public preferences about government spending: partisan, social and attitudinal sources of policy differences. *Political Behavior*, 4(2), 133–146.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Friedman, M. (1962). *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Garrett, G., & Mitchell, D. (2001). Globalization, government spending and taxation in the OECD. *European Journal of Political Research*, 39(2), 145–177.
- Goldstein, H. (2003). *Multilevel Statistical Models*. London: Hodder Arnold.
- Halman, L. (2001). *The European Values Study: A Third Wave*. EVS/WORC.
- Hasenfeld, Y., & Rafferty, J. A. (1989). The determinants of public attitudes toward the welfare state. *Social Forces*, 67(4), 1027–1048.
- ICPSR (2006). *World European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File*. ICPSR.
- International Labour Organization Social Security Expenditure Database (2009). Available at: <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/sesame/ifpses.socialdbexp> (accessed 7 July 2009).
- Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2001). An asset theory of social policy preferences. *American Political Science Review*, 95(4), 875–893.
- Iversen, T., & Wren, A. (1998). Equality, employment, and budgetary restraint: the trilemma of the service economy. *World Politics*, 50(4), 507-546.

- Jaeger, M. M. (2006). Welfare regimes and attitudes towards redistribution: the regime hypothesis revisited. *European Sociological Review*, 22(2), 157–170.
- Kaltenthaler, K. C., & Ceccoli, S. J. (2008). Explaining patterns of support for the provision of citizen welfare. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(7), 1041–1068.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). *Small States in World Markets*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kaufman, R. R., & Segura-Ubiergo, A. (2001). Globalization, domestic politics and social spending in Latin America: a time-series cross-section analysis, 1973-1999. *World Politics* 53(4), 553–587.
- Kikuzawa, S., Olafsdottir, S., & Pescosolido, B. (2008). Similar pressures, different contexts: public attitudes toward government intervention for health care in 21 nations. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 49(4), 385–399.
- Koster, F. (2009). The welfare state and globalisation: down and out or too tough to die? *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 18(2), 153–162.
- Koster, F., & Kaminska, M. E. (2012). Welfare state values in the European Union, 2002-2008. A multilevel investigation of formal institutions and individual attitudes. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(6), 900–920.
- Lewin-Epstein, N., Kaplan, A., & Levanon, A. (2003). Distributive justice and attitudes toward the welfare state. *Social Justice Research*, 16(1), 1–27.
- Lindbeck, A. (2006). *The Welfare State. Background, Achievements, Problems*. Stockholm: IUI, The Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Lipsmeyer, C., & Nordstrom, T. (2003). East versus west: comparing political attitudes and welfare preferences across European societies. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10(3), 339–364.
- Mau, S. (2004). Welfare regimes and the norms of social exchange. *Current Sociology*, 52(1): 53–74.
- Mishra, R. (1999). *Globalization and the Welfare State*. London: Edward Elgar.
- Moene, K. O., & Wallerstein, M. (2001). Inequality, social insurance, and redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 95(4), 859–874.
- O'Brien, K. L., & Leichenko, R. M. (2003). Winners and losers in the context of global change. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 93(1): 89–103.
- O'Riain, S. (2000). States and markets in an era of globalization. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 187–213.

- Pierson, P. (1996). The new politics of the welfare state. *World Politics*, 48(2), 143–179.
- Piven, F. F. (2001). Globalization, American politics, and welfare policy. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 577: 26–37.
- Rasbash, J., Steele, F., Browne, W., & Prosser, B. (2005). *A User's Guide to MlwiN*. Bristol: Centre of Multilevel Modelling.
- Rodrik, D. (1997). *Has Globalization Gone too Far?* Washington: Institute for International Economics.
- Rodrik, D. (1998). Why do more open economies have bigger governments? *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(5), 997–1032.
- Rothstein, B. (1998). *Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rudra, N. (2007). Welfare states in developing countries: unique or universal? *Journal of Politics*, 69(2), 378–396.
- Rudra, N., & Haggard, S. (2005). Globalization, democracy, and effective welfare spending in the developing world. *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(9), 1015–1049.
- Scharpf, F.W. (2000). Institutions in comparative policy research. *Comparative Political Studies*, 33(6/7), 762–790.
- Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. (2004). Economic insecurity and the globalization of production. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4), 662–674.
- Shapiro, R. Y., & Young, J. T. (1989). Public opinion and the welfare state: the United States in comparative perspective. *Political Science Quarterly*, 104(1), 59–89.
- Simmons, B. A., Dobbin, F., & Garrett, G. (2006). Introduction: the international diffusion of liberalism. *International Organization*, 60(4), 781–810.
- Snijders, T. A. B. (2003). Multilevel analysis. In M. Lewis-Beck, A. E. Bryman & T. F. Liao (Eds.). *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods (Volume II)* (pp. 673–677). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Snijders, T. A. B., & Bosker, R. J. (1999). *Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modeling*. London: Sage Publishers.
- Snower, D. J. (1993). The future of the welfare state. *The Economic Journal*, 103(May), 700–717.
- Svallfors, S. (1997). Worlds of welfare and attitudes to redistribution: a comparison of eight western nations. *European Sociological Review*, 13(3), 283–304.

UN-HDR (2009). Retrieved from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/> (accessed 7 July 2009).

Van Oorschot, W. (2002). Individual motives for contributing to welfare benefits in the Netherlands. *Policy and Politics*, 30(1), 31–46.

Weatherford, S. M. (1992). Measuring political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 86(1), 149–166.

Williamson, O. E. (1975). *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications*. New York: Free Press.

Wood, A. (1994). *North-South Trade, Employment, and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

World Values Survey (2009). Available at: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/> (accessed 7 July 2009).

Tables

Table 1. Summary of the dataset.

Variable	Min	Max	Mean	Source
Individual level				
Welfare state attitude ^(a)	3.48 (Switzerland)	7.86 (Republic of Korea)	5.66	WVS
Age	28.69 (Dominican Republic)	49.18 (Bulgaria)	41.61	WVS
Gender	43% (India)	63% (Ukraine)	52%	WVS
Educational level	2.37 (Morocco)	6.54 (Dominican Republic)	4.61	WVS
Income	2.59 (Brazil)	6.40 (the Netherlands)	4.68	WVS
Employed	20% (Bangladesh/Nigeria)	64% (Iceland/USA)	44%	WVS
Party preference ^(b)	3.61 (Zimbabwe)	9.05 (Vietnam)	5.70	WVS
Political trust	1.27 (Vietnam)	3.31 (Argentina)	2.76	WVS
National level				
Welfare state effort	0.97 (Pakistan)	56.94 (Germany)	38.69	ILO/IMF
Gini coefficient	21.70 (Hungary)	60.70 (South Africa)	36.74	UN
Economic openness	25.80 (Bangladesh)	97.33 (Luxembourg)	65.55	KOF Index of Globalisation

^(a) 1 = individual responsibility; 10 = government responsibility

^(b) 1 = left; 10 = right

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 29

Table 2. Correlation coefficients.

	1.	2.	3.
1. Welfare state attitude ^(a)			
2. Welfare state effort	-0.490 ***		
3. Gini coefficient	0.317 ***	-0.475 ***	
4. Economic openness	-0.491 ***	0.673 ***	-0.382 ***

^(a) 1 = individual responsibility; 10 = government responsibility

67 countries; 99,663 respondents

Source: WVS, ILO, UN, and KOF Index of Globalisation

*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Table 3. Multilevel analysis of welfare state attitudes.

	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>National level</i>				
Welfare state effort		-0.250** (0.115)	-0.067 (0.139)	-0.071 (0.140)
Gini coefficient		0.248** (0.112)	0.216* (0.111)	0.216* (0.111)
Wave		0.280 (0.300)	0.450 (0.292)	0.447 (0.292)
Economic openness			-0.380** (0.129)	-0.262* (0.134)
<i>Individual level</i>				
Age (1 = old)		-0.085*** (0.032)	-0.085*** (0.032)	-0.062* (0.034)
Female		0.151*** (0.023)	0.151*** (0.023)	0.152*** (0.023)
Education (1 = high)		-0.233*** (0.025)	-0.234*** (0.025)	-0.230*** (0.025)
Income (1 = high)		-0.327*** (0.026)	-0.326*** (0.026)	-0.324*** (0.026)
Employed (1 = yes)		-0.108*** (0.025)	-0.108*** (0.025)	-0.114*** (0.025)
Party preference (1 = right)		-0.429*** (0.023)	-0.429*** (0.023)	-0.422*** (0.023)
Political trust (1 = yes)		0.067*** (0.025)	0.066*** (0.025)	0.063** (0.025)
<i>Cross level interactions</i>				
Economic openness X age				-0.148*** (0.037)
Economic openness X gender				0.017 (0.025)
Economic openness X education				-0.023 (0.027)
Economic openness X income				-0.086*** (0.028)
Economic openness X employed				-0.029 (0.028)
Economic openness X party preference				-0.104*** (0.026)
Economic openness X political trust				0.011 (0.027)
Intercept	5.698*** (0.112)	5.757*** (0.277)	5.602*** (0.270)	5.609*** (0.270)
Intraclass Correlation	0.102	0.079	0.073	0.073
Deviance		799.617***	5.969**	45.778***

67 countries; 99,663 respondents

Standardised regression coefficients are reported; standard errors are in parentheses

Source: WVS, ILO, UN, and KOF Index of Globalisation

*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 31

Appendix A. Data per country.

	Number of respondents	WVS Wave	Welfare state attitude	Welfare state effort	Gini coefficient	Economic openness
Albania	1000	4	6.40	25.40	28.20	44.03
Algeria	1282	4	6.11	7.60	35.30	37.90
Argentina	1280	4	6.67	32.18	52.20	61.08
Australia	2048	3	5.04	44.86	35.20	72.31
Austria	1522	4	4.00	55.66	30.00	88.15
Azerbaijan	2001	3	7.41	22.95	36.00	45.45
Bangladesh	1495	4	5.56	6.86	31.80	25.80
Belarus	1000	4	5.64	34.92	30.40	48.09
Belgium	1905	4	4.99	47.08	25.00	95.96
Brazil	1149	3	5.45	29.92	59.10	50.07
Bulgaria	1000	4	5.11	44.98	31.90	68.66
Canada	1923	4	4.86	46.17	33.10	86.07
Chile	1200	4	7.13	37.45	57.10	74.22
Colombia	6013	3	5.96	6.10	57.60	49.40
Croatia	1003	4	5.21	49.34	29.00	61.17
Czech Republic	1902	4	4.89	47.75	25.40	81.65
Denmark	1023	4	4.39	52.10	24.70	91.70
Dominican Republic	414	3	5.53	14.26	47.40	35.89
El Salvador	1254	3	4.86	33.88	53.20	39.57
Estonia	1005	4	6.05	40.04	37.20	89.08
Finland	1017	4	4.57	53.87	26.90	90.64
France	1615	4	3.99	53.77	32.70	78.33
Germany	2034	4	4.73	56.94	28.30	78.79
Greece	1111	4	5.63	44.90	35.40	74.76
Hungary	998	4	6.09	33.30	24.40	81.30
Iceland	968	4	4.58	39.85	25.00	78.26
India	1995	4	6.68	3.44	32.50	32.80
Indonesia	1000	4	5.52	7.61	34.30	61.28
Iran (Islamic Republic)	2532	4	5.76	32.37	43.00	32.72
Ireland	986	4	4.54	42.76	35.90	96.60
Italy	2000	4	5.63	50.90	36.00	75.78
Japan	1362	4	6.66	47.17	34.90	51.62
Jordan	1223	4	6.99	19.86	36.40	66.19
Kyrgyzstan	1043	4	6.54	20.68	29.00	65.95
Latvia	1013	4	6.68	43.18	32.40	71.58
Lithuania	1018	4	5.42	45.00	31.90	70.35
Luxembourg	1211	4	4.47	53.50	30.80	97.33
Malta	1002	4	5.12	20.60	28.00	77.46
Mexico	1531	4	5.86	17.45	54.60	63.01
Morocco	2261	4	6.49	12.52	39.50	51.36
Netherlands	1002	4	4.68	46.06	32.60	95.46
New Zealand	1179	3	5.05	41.78	36.20	78.99
Nigeria	2022	4	7.30	1.00	50.60	55.43
Norway	1127	3	5.39	43.09	25.80	79.75
Pakistan	2000	4	7.13	0.97	33.00	33.73
Peru	1501	4	5.29	2.20	49.80	61.55
Philippines	1200	4	5.41	4.89	46.10	58.72
Poland	1095	4	5.73	51.56	31.60	63.06
Republic of Korea	1200	4	7.86	13.81	31.60	57.22
Republic of Moldova	1008	4	6.86	44.58	36.20	74.45
Romania	1146	4	4.82	42.19	30.30	55.65
Russian Federation	2500	4	5.78	28.67	45.60	52.16
Slovakia	1331	4	6.37	38.08	25.80	77.34
Slovenia	1004	4	6.54	52.91	28.40	64.99
South Africa	3000	4	6.16	19.83	59.30	67.18
Spain	2409	4	6.38	46.86	32.50	83.95
Sweden	1015	4	4.22	52.87	25.00	89.37
Switzerland	1204	3	3.48	50.34	33.10	82.93
Turkey	4603	4	6.32	12.46	40.00	61.62
Uganda	1002	4	6.46	2.27	43.00	46.50
Ukraine	1195	4	6.13	50.68	29.00	56.71

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 32

United Kingdom	971	4	4.45	47.40	36.00	82.62
United States	1200	4	4.31	46.30	40.80	69.18
Uruguay	1000	3	7.06	22.40	44.60	56.91
Venezuela	1200	4	5.45	3.13	49.10	61.33
Viet Nam	1000	4	4.44	13.76	37.00	49.23
Zimbabwe	1002	4	7.04	26.34	56.80	45.89
Total	99,663	---	5.66	32.69	36.74	65.55

Appendix A. Data per country (continued).

	Age (mean)	Female (%)	Educational level (mean)	Incom e (mean)	Employe d (%)	Party preference (mean)	Political trust (mean)
Albania	40.97	51	4.11	5.49	37	5.34	2.66
Algeria	35.58	49	5.08	3.12	46	6.22	2.97
Argentina	42.05	53	3.47	5.50	35	6.00	3.31
Australia	42.58	51	5.15	5.26	54	5.35	2.81
Austria	46.67	57	3.70	5.38	45	5.43	2.62
Azerbaijan	36.45	51	5.67	3.50	54	5.54	2.08
Bangladesh	33.74	45	3.83	4.68	20	7.56	1.65
Belarus	44.14	55	4.87	4.15	62	5.68	2.79
Belgium	46.39	54	5.22	5.39	43	5.20	2.77
Brazil	36.11	50	4.07	2.59	50	5.90	3.07
Bulgaria	49.18	57	5.39	4.89	40	5.88	2.91
Canada	46.12	60	4.98	5.00	52	5.49	2.70
Chile	41.45	53	4.17	4.15	40	5.22	2.84
Colombia	36.08	49	4.41	4.35	45	6.63	3.10
Croatia	39.22	57	5.47	4.38	48	5.08	3.01
Czech Republic	47.64	52	4.57	4.23	49	5.94	3.16
Denmark	45.76	51	4.34	5.33	59	5.51	2.53
Dominican Republic	28.69	59	6.54	4.55	52	6.63	3.18
El Salvador	37.85	53	3.76	5.40	32	6.30	2.94
Estonia	44.37	54	4.61	4.44	55	5.94	2.89
Finland	42.58	51	3.79	4.69	45	5.73	2.62
France	45.12	50	3.92	4.18	48	4.88	2.80
Germany	48.86	57	4.03	3.82	40	5.24	2.76
Greece	35.89	58	6.16	5.47	54	5.13	3.01
Hungary	47.08	53	3.99	3.93	44	5.04	2.87
Iceland	42.07	50	4.26	5.28	64	5.78	2.16
India	40.23	43	3.75	3.61	29	5.66	2.43
Indonesia	44.62	50	5.29	5.83	44	6.62	2.61
Iran (Islamic Republic)	34.18	46	4.82	5.03	33	4.82	2.11
Ireland	47.06	54	3.88	5.71	46	5.68	2.78
Italy	45.28	52	4.48	5.06	43	5.36	2.78
Japan	46.85	54	5.79	4.98	54	5.70	2.98
Jordan	36.06	51	3.96	3.48	28	5.97	2.13
Kyrgyzstan	37.04	55	5.75	4.30	36	6.20	2.85
Latvia	47.35	54	4.79	2.99	45	5.83	2.96
Lithuania	43.40	50	5.56	4.31	51	5.47	3.18
Luxembourg	40.35	52	4.35	5.31	53	5.32	2.39
Malta	46.21	52	4.31	4.91	43	5.80	2.54
Mexico	37.72	51	3.81	5.36	43	6.55	3.15
Morocco	33.36	51	2.37	4.21	33	5.70	3.24
Netherlands	46.38	51	4.94	6.40	56	5.08	2.46
New Zealand	47.44	55	4.74	5.93	60	5.79	3.11
Nigeria	30.68	49	4.23	5.20	20	5.51	2.59
Norway	43.26	51	4.90	5.50	63	5.57	2.26
Pakistan	36.62	48	3.44	4.49	28	5.94	1.97
Peru	35.50	51	5.27	3.22	33	5.69	3.15
Philippines	38.80	50	4.90	4.73	31	6.44	2.28
Poland	47.74	55	4.10	3.81	42	5.32	2.79
Republic of Korea	39.24	50	6.28	4.79	42	5.35	3.27
Republic of Moldova	42.77	56	4.96	3.85	41	5.59	2.86
Romania	46.29	51	4.28	5.41	38	5.83	3.17
Russian Federation	46.83	59	5.05	5.74	51	4.87	3.18
Slovakia	43.47	51	4.46	5.32	55	5.13	2.73
Slovenia	43.57	54	4.31	5.42	52	4.99	2.92
South Africa	37.97	50	3.39	4.86	39	5.40	2.53
Spain	45.82	51	3.72	4.33	38	4.75	2.56
Sweden	44.19	50	4.94	5.84	63	5.37	2.50
Switzerland	45.04	50	4.22	5.75	56	5.34	2.64
Turkey	36.62	50	3.62	3.22	28	5.80	2.83

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes 34

Uganda	30.15	50	4.48	2.97	41	5.36	1.92
Ukraine	45.60	63	5.56	3.24	51	5.47	3.01
United Kingdom	44.12	56	4.10	5.22	50	5.04	2.75
United States	42.36	58	5.68	5.56	64	5.81	2.68
Uruguay	46.35	59	3.73	5.17	41	5.53	2.77
Venezuela	36.22	50	4.89	5.39	36	6.32	2.92
Viet Nam	42.60	51	3.50	5.24	21	9.05	1.27
Zimbabwe	34.91	50	2.89	3.20	49	3.61	2.50
Total	41.61	52	4.61	4.68	44	5.70	2.7